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INTRODUCTION
Cultural resources can be defined as "the tangible and intangible ef-
fects of an individual or group of people that define their existence, and
place them temporally and geographically in relation to their belief systems
and their familial and political groups, providing meaning to their lives."'
The field of cultural resources includes tangible items, such as land, sacred
* Gerald Carr is a third year student in the Indigenous Law Program at Michigan State
University College of Law. He holds a Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology, specializing in the
languages and cultures of native North America. Thanks to Wenona Singel for thoughtful
guidance through the development of this paper; thanks especially to Barbra Meek.
1. Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property
Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 77 (2005) (quoting SHERRY HUTT ET AL., CULTURAL PROP-
ERTY LAW xi (2004)). This definition parallels many others in the indigenous rights literature.
The United Nation's Human Rights Sub-Commission defines heritage as "all objects, sites and
knowledge, including languages, the nature of which has been transmitted from generation to
generation, and which is regarded as pertinent to a particular people or its territory of traditional
natural use." U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Seminar on the Draft Princi-
ples and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 112, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/
26 (June 19, 2000). WIPO defines traditional knowledge as that which is
generated, preserved and transmitted in a traditional and intergenerational context;
distinctively associated with a traditional indigenous community of people which
preserves and transmits it between generations; and is integral to the cultural iden-
tity of an indigenous or traditional community of people which is recognized as
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sites, and religious and finerary objects. The field also includes intangible
knowledge and customs, such as tribal names, symbols, stories, and eco-
logical, ethnopharmacological, religious, qr other traditional knowledge. 2
The tangible cultural resources of tribes can fall under the protection of
statutes such as the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 19793 and
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 1990
(NAGPRA).4 The protection of intangible cultural resources, however, is
less codified.5
The provision of legal protection for intangible cultural resources has
focused almost entirely on either linking such protection to human rights
or defining intangible culture as intellectual property (IP).6 The United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides for the
rights of indigenous groups to maintain and develop their culture and ad-
vises member states to establish protections for indigenous culture, both
tangible and intangible.7 The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has further developed the area through
its Human Rights Sub-Commission's Draft Principles and Guidelines for
the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, the Convention for
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), and other
documents. Early work on defining intangible cultural resources as IP was
conducted jointly by UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO), which led to the Model Provisions for National Laws
on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation
and Other Prejudicial Actions (1985). Work by WIPO continues today
through its Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
holding the knowledge through a form of custodianship, guardianship, collective
ownership or cultural responsibility.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., REVISED DRAFT PROVISIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: POLICY OBJECTIVES AND CORE PRINCIPLES, at annex 22 (2006).
2. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 20.01 (2012). WIPO,
through its Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, has divided intangible cultural resources into three catego-
ries: traditional knowledge, genetic resources, and "traditional cultural expressions" or "expres-
sions of folklore." Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional Cultural Expressions/
Folklore, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
3. 16 U.S.C. %§ 470aa-470mm (2006).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2006) (providing a mechanism for the repatriation of human re-
mains, funerary objects, "sacred objects," and "objects of cultural patrimony" associated with
federally-recognized tribes).
5. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 20.
6. For a discussion of the field of tangible and intangible cultural property, and efforts to
protect it, see Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property,
118 YALE L. J. 1022 (2009).
7. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/ 295, U.N. Doc. A/
Res/61/295, art. 11-13, 31 (Sept. 13, 2007).
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Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore." This is comple-
mented by a growing body of law, mostly in other countries, using prop-
erty law to halt cultural appropriation from indigenous communities.9
However, as it stands, IP law, in general, may be a poor fit for tribes.
In the tribal context, rights to traditional knowledge and other forms of
intangible cultural resources may be dispersed among members in ways in
which IP would recognize as placing them in the public domain. Thus, IP
law would not protect those rights. Copyright protection, for instance,
extends only to "original works of authorship."10 But traditional arts, cus-
toms, and expressions, often the target of for-profit appropriation by out-
siders, can no longer be traced to an author. In the originating society,
informal rules of traditional deference operate to keep intangible cultural
resources in the proper hands. Outsiders, however, may not follow these
protocols. If such informal rules cannot be upheld by IP law, the originat-
ing culture will be left without remedy for misappropriation."
Additionally, traditional knowledge may also be sacred, or otherwise
secret, and require special usage.12 IP law offers trade secret and patent
protection, but it does not offer protection for traditional knowledge such
as knowledge of religious rituals or folktales. Trade secret protection re-
quires that the information is "used in one's business" and is "not generally
known."' 3 Neither of these is characteristic of traditional knowledge. The
element of "used in one's business" demonstrates that the aims of IP law
diverge from tribal interests because the primary goal of IP law is the com-
moditization of knowledge, whereas tribes want protection from that very
process, as well as privacy.1 4 Tailoring these laws to fit tribal needs and
purposes requires expansion of law in ways that Congress currently does
not support.' 5 If Congress was supportive, however, Native legal scholars
note that adoption of the IP framework by tribes could function to fossil-
ize intangible cultural resources and would generally be a neo-colonialist
enterprise working against tribal self-determination and sovereignty.' 6
These problems show that tribes need alternatives to the protection of in-
tangible cultural resources through human rights and IP frameworks.
8. Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional Cultural Expressions/ Folklore,
supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4.1(2012).
11. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 20.01.
12. Id.
13. 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW %§ 5:6-5:7 (2012).
14. Id. See generally Rosemary Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Commu-
nity Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 275 (2001); James D.
Nason, Traditional Property and Modern Laws: The Need for Native American Community Intellectual
Property Rights Legislation, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 255 (2001).
15. See Riley, supra note 1, at 85-86.
16. Id. at 86-88, 119.
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This Comment explores alternatives that exist in the form of regula-
tion of research and tort actions against researchers who violate these regu-
lations. It is premised on the observation that one of the primary means by
which culture has been appropriated from American Indian communities
has been through social scientific research.' 7 Indians' 8 are among the most
heavily studied groups in fields like medicine, public health, and, recently,
genetics.19 Yet anthropology, more than any other discipline, has made
American Indians the subjects of research.
Anthropology began as a social science in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and distinguished itself by specializing in non-Western (called "primi-
tive," at the time) cultures. The cultural, linguistic, and physical differences
between the indigenous population of North America and the colonizers
from Europe motivated the testing of theories. Reservations offered a cap-
tive population of human subjects. In return for access to data, anthropolo-
gists offered help in assimilation. In 1879, the federal government
organized the Bureau of American Ethnology to collect research on the
archaeology and ethnography of North America. Anthropologists were
hired to study indigenous people scientifically so that the government
could more effectively administer to these people. Due to academic an-
thropology's adherence to the principle of intellectual freedom and the
nature of Bureau anthropologists' as agents of the federal government, eth-
nographic collections of intangible cultural resources were made available
to the public. This was a problem because American Indians considered
much of this data sensitive and private. 20 Such actions, as well as the moti-
vations behind them, set the stage for contemporary mistrust of scientific
research in Indian country.2 1
Today, researchers studying Indian populations face the criticisms
that their research serves the needs of the dominant society rather than the
Indian community. 22 Critics also argue that there is generally a lack of
17. Here, I analogize from Russel Lawrence Barsh, Who Steals Indigenous Knowledge?, 95
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 153, 154 (2001) (arguing that biopiracy results more from academics
publishing research than pharmaceutical corporations' patents).
18. In conformity with conventions in federal Indian law, the term Indian or American
Indian is used throughout this paper rather than the term Native American. Nearly all federal
statutes and federal agencies use the term Indian.
19. See Ron J. Whitener, Research in Native American Communities in the Genetics Age: Can
the Federal Data Sharing Statute of General Applicability and Tribal Control of Research be Reconciled?,
15 J. TECH. L. & PoL'Y 217, 218-19 (2010).
20. The Bureau of American Ethnology, before it merged with the Smithsonian in 1965,
published eighty-one Annual Reports, two hundred Bulletins, and over forty other publications of
ethnographic and archaeological materials from North (and South) American research projects.
List of Publications of the Bureau of American Ethnology, SMITHSONIAN LIBR., http://www.sil.si.
edu/DigitalCollections/BAE/Bulletin200/200conts.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). Academic
publishing has been more robust.
21. Whitener, supra note 19, at 242.
22. NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, COMMENTS ON ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING (ANPRM) FOR "HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH PROTECTIONS: ENHANCING
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benefit to the communities studied, that research subjects are often treated
without dignity, and that the publication of cultural and religious informa-
tion impacts the efficacy or significance of the beliefs. 23 Critics further
argue that the current regulations governing research on human subjects
fail to prevent these and other harms to indigenous peoples. 2 4
In the first part of this Comment, I review this system of federal
regulations, in particular, the evaluation of risk to human subjects in ap-
proving research, the general requirements of informed consent, and the
mechanisms of enforcement. Additionally, I discuss proposed changes to
the federal system that will impact tribes' ability to protect intangible cul-
tural resources, and what tribes can and should do to protect their interests
by regulating research on their citizens.
Second, this Comment explores the opportunities that tort law offers
for the protection of intangible cultural resources. First, I review how tort
law is increasingly encompassing harms to research subjects. This will in-
clude a discussion as applied in Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents,
a tort case alleging harm to tribal research subjects. 2 5 I will then describe
the elements of a tort case and explain how these elements can be satisfied
by drawing on the federal regulations for human subjects protections. The
use of tort law can be an alternative to protecting intangible cultural prop-
erty with IP law. By utilizing the existing framework for research regula-
tion and tort law, tribes can stem the flow of cultural appropriation while
allowing tribal political and cultural sovereignty to continue to grow.
I. THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH
Before 1974, there were no federal laws or regulations that specifi-
cally protected human subjects in research. 2 6 International documents such
as the Nuremberg Code established ethical standards, but such documents
were not binding on U.S. agencies. 27 In 1974, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare promulgated its first regulations for human subjects
research. 2 8 Also at this time, Congress passed the National Research Act,
which created the National Commission for the Protection of Human
PROTECTIONS FOR RESEARCH SUBJECTS AND REDUCING BURDEN, DELAY, AND AMBIGUITY
FOR INVESTIGATORS" (2011); MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH CODE 1 (Am. Indian Law Ctr. 1999),
available at http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/NPTAOResearchProtocolsWebPage/Al-
LawCenterModelCode.pdf.
23. MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH CODE 1 (Am. Indian Law Ctr. 1999), available at http://
www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/NPTAOResearchProtocolsWebPage/AlLawCenterModel
Code.pdf.
24. Id.; NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 22.
25. 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
26. Beth S. Rose & Vincent Lodato, Litigation: The Role of Class Actions in Litigation In-
volving Human Research Subjects, 3 Med. Res. L. & Pol'y Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 1 (May 5, 2004).
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id.
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Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National Commis-
sion).29 The National Commission's recommendations were published as
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research
(1979) (commonly known, and referred to here, as the "Belmont Re-
port"). Three key guidelines were set for scientific research, all of which
were built into the current regulatory scheme: respect for persons, from
which is derived the principle of informed consent; beneficence, from
which is derived the cost-benefit analysis of research approval; and justice,
which promotes fair subject selection criteria.30
In 1981, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) de-
veloped new regulations for the protection of human subjects based on the
Belmont Report. The FDA followed, and soon after numerous federal de-
partments and agencies began developing similar regulations. Today, the
HHS regulations, codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, are known as the Common
Rule. The Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), within
HHS, implements the regulations. 3 1
HHS's Protection of Human Subjects regulations, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46,
apply to "all research involving human subjects conducted, supported or
otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or agency"
adopting the Common Rule.3 2 Each federal department or agency that has
adopted the Common Rule is governed by its own regulations.3 3 The
head of that department or agency "retains final judgment as to whether a
particular activity conducted or supported by the respective department or
agency is covered by the Common Rule," as well as final authority as to
whether research conducted complies with regulations. 34 Subpart A of
Part 46 contains the basic protections for all human subjects; subparts B-D
describe additional protections for certain named "vulnerable popula-
tions," and subpart E requires registration of institutional review boards
(IRBs).3
Every institution conducting HHS-supported research on human
subjects must provide an assurance that it will comply with HHS regula-
tions.3 6 This is provided through a written agreement, called an assurance
29. Id. at 1-2; see also Office for Human Research Prots., Regulations, U.S. DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/index.htmIl (last visited
Mar. 9, 2013).
30. Rose & Lodato, supra note 26, at 2.
31. Office for Human Research Prots., About OHRP, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH &
Hum. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
32. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2011).
33. Office for Human Research Prots., Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of
Human Subjects, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES, T 3(c), http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/assurances/assurances/filasurt.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
34. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(c).
35. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (the vulnerable populations identified are: pregnant women, human
fetuses, and neonates [subpart B], prisoners [subpart C], and children [subpart D]).
36. Id. § 46.103(a).
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of compliance, or Federalwide Assurance (FWA).37 An institution's FWA
applies to the entire institution, its IRB, and all its investigators, employees,
and agents.3 8 Because it is federal-wide, the FWA can be used for research
supported by any federal department or agency that has adopted the Com-
mon Rule.3 9 FWAs are the only form of agreement that can fulfill this
requirement. 4 0 The FWA also binds the institution to "comply with any
additional applicable human subjects regulations and policies of the U.S.
federal department or agency which conducts or supports the research and
any other applicable federal, state, local, or institutional laws, regulations,
and policies." 4 ' This savings clause is reproduced in the regulations at
5 46.101 (e) and (f). 4 2
Assurance of compliance with the Common Rule is achieved by re-
viewing research on human subjects. This is done through an institution's
IRB. IRBs must approve all qualifying research done by an institution, and
an institution cannot approve research disapproved by the IRB.4 3 An IRB
also has the authority to suspend or terminate its approval of research vio-
lating IRB requirements.44 Federal funding cannot be used if research is
disapproved or if approval is terminated. 45
In addition, all IRBs must be registered. Creating an IRB and signing
an FWA are simple and can be done online. 46 According to § 46.107,
IRBs must be staffed by members with "varying backgrounds." 4 7 This di-
versity of membership is to be achieved through "consideration of race,
gender, and cultural backgrounds and sensitivity to such issues as commu-
nity attitudes." 4 8 The purpose of this diversity is "to promote respect for
[the IRBs] advice and counsel in safeguarding the rights and welfare of
human subjects." 4 9
37. Office for Human Research Prots., Federalwide Assurances (FWAs), U.S. DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/assurances/assurances/index.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2013).
38. Office for Human Research Prots., Compliance Oversight Procedures for Evaluating Insti-
tutions, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES. (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/compliance/evaluation.
39. Id.
40. Office for Human Research Prots., supra note 37.
41. Office for Human Research Prots., supra note 33.
42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(e) ("Compliance with this policy requires compliance with perti-
nent federal laws or regulations which provide additional protections for human subjects"); id.
§ 46.101(f) ("This policy does not affect any state or local laws or regulations which may other-
wise be applicable and which provide additional protections for human subjects.").
43. Id. §46.112.
44. Id. § 46.113.
45. See id. § 46.122.
46. Electronic Submission System, OFF. FOR Hum. RES. PROTECTIONs, http://ohrp.cit.
nih.gov/efile/Default.aspx (last visited May 7, 2012).
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The human subjects protections promulgated by HHS establish mini-
mum standards. An IRB may establish more stringent requirements for its
membership, the review process, or what research may qualify for expe-
dited review or satisfy informed consent.5 0 The Indian Health Service
(IHS) is one agency that has added further protections. For example, IHS's
IRB may require either that tribal members review research as IRB mem-
bers, or that the research statement and purposes that are given to research
subjects also be given to their tribes for approval. 5 ' They also may require
investigators to submit manuscripts to tribes and IHS's IRB for approval
before publication.5 2
A. Review and Risk
The regulations under 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 provide for three levels of
review of research involving human subjects.5 3 The lowest level of review
is the exempt category. To qualify for an exemption of IR3 review, pro-
posed research must fall into one of the following categories: educational
research, taste tests, or survey, interview, and observation of public behav-
ior research (in which individual human subjects could not be identified or
put at risk).5 4 Whether research falls into this last category is largely a de-
termination of the researcher. If the research poses no risk to subjects, the
research need not be reviewed at all.5 5
The intermediate level of review is the expedited review, which is
for research "involving no more than minimal risk."5 6 "Minimal risk
means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort antici-
pated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordi-
narily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine
physical or psychological examinations or tests." 5 7 Again, it is largely the
investigator who makes the determination of minimal risk, but an expe-
dited review usually requires review of the research by one IRB member.
Certain listed procedures58 are automatically considered to pose only mini-
50. See 45 C.F.R. %§ 46.101-124.
51. Human Research Participant Protection in the Indian Health Service, INDIAN HEALTH SER-
VICE, http://www.ihs.gov/Research/index.cfm?module=hrpp-about (last visited March 9,
2013).
52. Id.
53. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512, 44514 (July
26, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 and 25 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
54. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101.
55. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44514.
56. 45 C.F.R. S 46.110.
57. Id. § 46.102(i).
58. Protection of Human Subjects: Categories of Research That May Be Reviewed by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) Through an Expedited Review Procedure, at 63 Fed.
Reg. 60,364, 60,364-67 (Nov. 9, 1998).
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mal risk to subjects, and therefore may be reviewable through expedited
review or may even be exempt from review.5 9 Among the procedures
listed are:
(A)(6) [c]ollection of data from voice, video, digital, or image
recordings made for research purposes [and] (7) [r]esearch on
individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but
not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation,
identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices,
and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview,
oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors
evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. 60
Because social scientific research involving intangible cultural resources is
usually limited to these procedures, it will almost always qualify for expe-
dited review or be exempt altogether. Finally, it is important to note that
expedited research is still subject to the rules of informed consent.6 1
The highest level of review, full IRB review, is applied to studies
involving more than minimal risk.62 These risks are placed into three cate-
gories: physical, psychological, and informational.63 Physical risks are asso-
ciated with medical research and are the type anticipated by the Common
Rule. Psychological risks "include unintentional anxiety and stress includ-
ing feelings of sadness or even depression, feelings of betrayal, and exacer-
bation of underlying psychiatric conditions such as post-traumatic stress
disorder." 64 "Informational risks derive from inappropriate use or disclo-
sure of information, which could be harmful to the study subjects or
groups. For instance, disclosure of illegal behavior, substance abuse, or
chronic illness might jeopardize current or future employment, or cause
emotional or social harm."6 5
In general, the requirement for approval of reviewed proposals is that
risks to human subjects are minimized. 66 This can be achieved by "using
procedures which are consistent with sound research design and which do
not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk."6 7 Full IRB review invokes the
59. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110.
60. Protection of Human Subjects: Categories of Research That May Be Reviewed by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) Through an Expedited Review Procedure, 63 Fed. at
60,366-67.
61. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,514
(July 26, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 and 25 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).




66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1) (2011).
67. Id.
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three principles of the Belmont Report. First, the regulations require bal-
ancing of the risks and benefits of the research: "Risks to subjects are rea-
sonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the
importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result."6 8
Second, there must be a selection of subjects that is equitable especially
taking into account "vulnerable populations, such as . . . economically or
educationally disadvantaged persons."6 9 Third, the rules of informed con-
sent apply.70 Protection of the privacy of subjects is also required under
certain circumstances. 7 ' Finally, in addition to these requirements, studies
should contain additional safeguards when "some or all of the subjects are
likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such as children,
prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or economically or
educationally disadvantaged persons." 72
B. General Requirements of Informed Consent
Investigators cannot involve human subjects in research unless they
have obtained those subjects' "legally effective informed consent."73 The
circumstances of seeking consent must provide subjects with "sufficient
opportunity to consider whether or not to participate" while minimizing
the "possibility of coercion or undue influence." 74 Subjects can neither
waive any legal rights in providing informed consent nor release the inves-
tigator or the institution "from liability for negligence."7 5
The eight basic elements of informed consent are provided in
§ 46.116(a). Not all are directly relevant to research on intangible cultural
resources, but those that are require that research subjects be provided: (1)
a statement of explanation and participation, including procedures; (2)
"[a] description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the
subject"; (3) "[a] description of any benefits to the subject or to others
which may reasonably be expected from the research"; and (5) a statement
describing the extent of confidentiality being provided. 76
Additionally, informed consent must be documented in a written
consent form.77 Waiver of documentation is permitted, however, when
"research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and in-
volves no procedures for which written consent is normally required
68. Id. §46.111(a)(2).
69. Id. 5 46.111 (a)(3).
70. Id. 5 46.111 (a)(4).
71. Id. § 46.111 (a)(7).
72. Id. §46.111 (b).
73. Id. § 46.116.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 46.116(a).
77. Id. S 46.117.
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outside of the research context."78 This exception would apply to most, if
not all, research on intangible cultural resources because, as noted above,
the research methods of social science tend to be those automatically
deemed to pose minimal or no risk.7 9
C. Enforcing Human Subjects Protections
The power of an IRB to enforce human subjects protections is lim-
ited to disapproval of research and discontinuation of funding. Federal
funds cannot be used to support research that fails to meet the require-
ments of 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, whether through disapproval of the research
during review, or suspension or termination of research at continuing
review.80
IRBs themselves are also subject to scrutiny. OHRP's Division of
Compliance Oversight, pursuant to § 289 of the Public Health Service Act
and 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, evaluates complaints of noncompliance by institu-
tions and investigators that conduct human subjects research.81 Compli-
ance oversight evaluations are made at the discretion of OHRP. 8 2 OHRP
only has jurisdiction over human subjects research directly supported by
HHS or covered under an approved FWA. If the research is conducted by,
or solely supported by, a federal department or agency other than HHS,
then Compliance Oversight will refer the matter to that department or
agency, which will then retain final authority for determining
compliance.83
Evaluations by Compliance Oversight may be for-cause or not-for-
cause. 8 4 For-cause evaluations are those initiated upon receipt of written
substantive allegations of noncompliance submitted by research subjects,
family members, investigators and their personnel, or institutions; not-for-
cause evaluations are initiated by OHRP based on a range of considera-
tions.8 5 Under 45 C.F.R. 5 46.103(e), the outcome of an oversight evalua-
tion, either for-cause or not-for-cause, is limited to: (1) a finding of
compliance; (2) a finding of compliance but with recommendations for
improvements in the institution's human subject protection policies; and
(3) a finding of noncompliance.8 6 Findings of noncompliance can result in
78. Id. § 46.117(c)(2).
79. See id. § 46.101(b) (listing types of studies exempted from review); Protection of
Human Subjects: Categories of Research That May Be Reviewed by the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) Through an Expedited Review Procedure, 63 Fed. Reg. 60,364, 60,366-67 (Nov.
09, 1998) (compiling a list of procedures considered to pose minimal risk to human subjects).
80. 45 C.F.R. § 46.122.
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a variety of consequences. Such findings can require, for example, re-re-
view of approved research, increased training, the attachment of restric-
tions or conditions to the institution's FWA, or suspension of the FWA,
which mandates a suspension of all supported research. 7 Upon a finding
of noncompliance, OHRP may also recommend to HHS officials that an
institution or investigator be suspended or permanently removed from par-
ticipation in certain projects or even debarred from all government-sup-
ported work.8 8
D. HHS's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
In 2011, HHS issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) entitled Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing
Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Am-
biguity for Investigators.89 The proposed rulemaking was in response to
changes in the nature of scientific research involving human subjects and to
numerous criticisms about the effectiveness of the current rules and the
burden they place on researchers. 90 Seven broad areas of change were
proposed:
1. Refinement of the existing risk-based regulatory
framework;
2. Utilization of a single IRB review of record for domestic
sites of multi-site studies;
3. Improvement of consent forms and the consent process;
4. Establishment of mandatory data security and information
protection standards for all studies that involve identifiable
or potentially identifiable data;
5. Establishment of an improved, more systematic approach
for the collection and analysis of data on unanticipated
problems and adverse events;
6. Extension of federal regulatory protections to all research,
regardless of finding source, conducted at institutions in
the United States that receive some federal funding from a
Common Rule agency for research with human subjects;
and




89. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512 (July 26,
2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 (2012) and 25 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2012)).
90. See id. at 44,513.
91. Id. at 44,514.
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The proposals arose from specific criticisms about the appropriateness of
IRB review for social and behavioral research. These critics argue that so-
cial science research is "overregulated," pointing to a paucity of research
proving that risks even exist in this research, and to a lack of evidence that
the rules would provide any protection. 92 Deregulation, critics argue, may
help "identify those social and behavioral research studies that do pose
threats to the welfare of subjects and thus do merit significant oversight."93
Elements of this proposed deregulation include the elimination of contin-
ued review for minimal risk studies unless the researcher requests it; revi-
sion and regular updating of the list of categories of research that are
reviewable under expedited review; and the creation of a presumption that
research categories on the list are minimal risk.94 More importantly, the
ANPRM questions whether research that qualifies for expedited review
should have to meet the requirements under § 46.111 at all.95
Toward this end, the most significant proposed changes are in the
exempt category. First, HHS proposes that this category be renamed the
"excused" category.96 Second, HHS proposes to expand the excused cate-
gory to encompass all social and behavioral research utilizing "educational
tests, surveys, focus groups, interviews, and similar procedures," as well as
those that
... involve specified types of benign interventions ... that are
known to involve virtually no risk to subjects, and for which
prior review does little to increase protections to subjects.
These would be methodologies which are very familiar to peo-
ple in everyday life and in which verbal or similar responses
would be the research data being collected.9 7
Under this proposal, nearly all ethnographic research would be excused
because the ethnographic method relies almost entirely on verbal responses
of subjects to gather data. The only requirements for the new, expanded
excused category would be that the informed consent rules are followed,
that the research conforms to the new information protection standards,
and that research subjects be competent adults-meaning "able to provide
legally effective informed consent." 9 8 Researchers would be required to
file a statement that the research is exempt before starting research, but
after signing, researchers could begin research immediately.9 9 No review
of this statement would be required, but random audits may be done to
92. See id. at 44,513.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 44,516-17.
95. Id. at 44,517.
96. See id. at 44,518.
97. Id. at 44,518-19.
98. Id. at 44,518.
99. Id. at 44,520.
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check for compliance.' 00 Finally, despite strengthening informed consent
rules, HHS seeks to retain the rule allowing for oral consent without writ-
ten documentation for research procedures such as interviews.10 '
The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) was one of the
respondents to the ANPRM.102 In 2003, NCAI established its Policy Re-
search Center.1 0 3 The goal of this Center's tribal research regulation work
is to ensure that research "conducted on [tribal] lands and with [tribal]
citizens is ethical, affirms tribal sovereignty, and contributes to community
well being." NCAI's comments call for initial and continuing review of
research involving American Indians and Alaska Natives, more involve-
ment for tribal IRBs, and oversight of proposed secondary uses of data
collected.10 4 They are against relaxing the criteria for expedited review
and reject the proposal that researchers be allowed to self-declare their re-
search excused. 0 5 Regarding informed consent, NCAI argues that "[a]s
sovereign nations, tribes have jurisdiction over research conducted using
information collected on their land and from their citizens; and, as such,
their rights must be considered as part of the informed consent, data re-
porting, and data ownership processes." 0 6 Finally, they support the idea of
extending the Common Rule to all research, regardless of federal
funding. 107
These comments reflect the significant weaknesses of the current
HHS regulations in protecting tribal human subjects of research. They also
anticipate further weakening that would result if the proposed changes are
implemented, especially in the areas of intangible cultural resources.
Therefore, tribes need to rely less on external support in protecting intan-
gible cultural resources. Instead, they should strengthen their own internal
measures for stopping loss.10 As NCAI points out, the history of research
on Indians demonstrates a lack of concern for tribal subjects, sometimes
resulting in harm.109 Tribes have been left out of the research review pro-
cess, leaving researchers and their institutions to determine what is best for
tribal subjects. Moreover, instead of strengthening protections for tribal
research subjects, the ANPRM is not primarily concerned with increasing
100. Id. at 44,526.
101. Id. at 44,519.
102. NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 22, at 1.
103. Whitener, supra note 19, at 241.
104. NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 22, at 1-2.
105. Id. at 3-5.
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id. at 16.
108. As the American Indian Law Center wrote, in describing reasons for developing tribal
research protocols, "[tihe fundamental responsibility to govern Indian tribes and to protect their
members lies in the tribes themselves." MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH CODE 4 (Am. Indian Law
Ctr. 1999), available at http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/NPTAOResearchProtocols
WebPage/AILawCenterModelCode.pdf.
109. See NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 22, at 1.
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protections for human subjects. Since the ANPRM was motivated by
complaints from researchers of overregulation, it is instead concerned with
reducing oversight. The next section discusses how tribes can protect
themselves from harms more likely to occur with deregulation of social
science human subjects research.
E. Tribal Regulation of Research Involving Human Subjects
There are many reasons why a tribe would want IRB oversight
within its jurisdiction. First, local tribes have a better understanding of
local issues and the local culture. They understand which research ques-
tions or topics may be more unsettling or improper within their communi-
ties, and they also better understand the impact past researchers have had
on their people.o10 Therefore, during the review process, tribes are much
more likely to be aware of, and thus consider, what could potentially harm
their communities and what could serve as a benefit.
Second, a tribe's interpretation of harms and benefits could be vastly
different from what an outsider would consider to be harmful or benefi-
cial. IRBs apply a risk calculus. Thus, what an outsider considers ajustifia-
ble risk in relation to its benefits can vary greatly from what locals, who
must bear the risk, would determine."' This is especially pertinent for the
expedited and exempt categories; IRBs are allowed, but are not required,
to let the investigator make the threshold determination that more than
minimal risk is involved.112 For social scientific investigation of intangible
cultural resources, an outside researcher is neither obligated to discover
what the holders of those resources deem minimal risk to their interests
nor obligated to have the subjects evaluate what benefits derive from the
research.
But even with a tribal IRB, there are substantial gaps in the protec-
tion of human subjects and the cultural resources tribes have. IRBs pertain
to research that is generally described as scientific investigation and are for
the protection of human subjects only. They have as their only sanction
the discontinuation of federal funding. But not all research that can impact
tribal cultural resources is "research" involving human subjects and feder-
ally funded. Much research will elude the definition provided by HHS,
which is "a systematic investigation, including research development, test-
ing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
110. See NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 22, at 2.
111. See William L. Freeman, Starting an Institutional Review Board: Suggestions for Tribes and
Tribal Colleges, U. WASH. COMMUNITY-CAMPUS PARTNERSHIPS FOR HEALTH, 1 (May 23,
2007), http://depts.washington.edu/ccph/pdf files/Starta_TribalIRB.pdf.
112. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Sub-
jects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512,
44,514 (July 26, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 (2012) and 25 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56
(2012)).
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knowledge." 13 Researchers in the fields of history, linguistics, and Ameri-
can Indian studies, for instance, typically do not seek IRB approval, even if
they use the same research methodologies as anthropologists who are usu-
ally required to get IRB approval." 4 Research may also be conducted for
fictional writing projects, fictional films, documentaries and the like, and
that would similarly not be considered "research."
Projects can also avoid IRB by not having human subjects as their
target or source. A human subject is defined by HHS as "a living individ-
ual about whom an investigator . . . conducting research obtains (1) [d]ata
through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2)
[i]dentifiable private information." 1 5 The lack of human subjects, ac-
cording to this definition, in archaeological research is the reason that the
discipline does not need IRB approval even though most tribes would
argue that archaeology has a significant impact on people. Next, research-
ers can escape IRB by relying on funding from private foundations and
NGOs. Tribes must also consider that there may be researchers who self-
designate their research as exempt when it should not be, or who gain IRB
approval then violate the terms of that approval.
Tribes need to expand the scope of research regulations and exercise
sovereign authority to regulate research on their lands. This may be the
most effective way for tribes to stem the loss from cultural appropriation.
Tribes are sovereign nations who have the authority to regulate action on
their lands, which includes regulating scientific research." 6 This may come
in the form of IRBs with standards that are more stringent than that which
are mandated by HHS or IHS. This can also be done by fonning commu-
nity advisory boards unattached to the IRB system or by adopting laws to
regulate research and impose penalties for noncompliance.' 1 7 Tribes can
113. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2011); see also MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH CODE 3 (Am.
Indian Law Ctr. 1999), available at http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/NPTAOResearch
ProtocolsWebPage/AlLawCenterModelCode.pdf (examining an IHS definition).
114. The difference is largely due to the professional ethics of the discipline. Compare Ethics
Resources, AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL Ass'N, http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/ethics/Ethics-Re-
sources.cfin (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (the 2009 code is the most recent but the code was
originally adopted in 1971), with Linguistic Society of America, The LSA Ethics Statement, LSA
ETHICS DiscussioN BLOG, http://lsaethics.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013)
(noting the LSA's current efforts to develop a professional ethics statement that considers human
subjects).
115. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f).
116. PUNEET CHAWLA SAHOTA, NCAI POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, RESEARCH REGU-
LATION IN AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE COMMUNITIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE CON-
SIDERATIONS 6 (2007), available at http://depts.washington.edu/ccph/pdf files/Research%20
Regulation%20in%20AI%20AN%20Communities%20-%20Policy%/20and%20Practice.pdf;
NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 22, at 2. See generally MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH
CODE (Am. Indian Law Ctr. 1999), available at http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/
NPTAOResearchProtocolsWebPage/AlLawCenterModelCode.pdf.
117. SAHOTA, supra note 116, at 8-14 (discussing the various approaches to research regu-
lation in American Indian/Alaska Native communities.).
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protect their citizens and further assert their sovereignty by exercising self-
government instead of waiting for an external agency to change its policies
or relying on investigators to self-regulate."" Several tribes, such as the
Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, and Ho-Chunk Nation, already have re-
search codes." 9 In addition, the American Indian Law Center has pro-
duced a Model Tribal Research Code.120 Under a tribal research code,
violators could face one or a combination of penalties. Violators could be
fined or lose a deposit, or their research can be terminated and confiscated.
Violators could also face eviction or banishment from tribal lands under
trespass laws.1 2 1
However, this would still not be a perfect solution; the impediment
to this system is the limited jurisdiction of tribal courts.12 2 This limitation
could be constitutional. Although some tribal constitutions limit the full
scope of the tribal government's power, the more significant obstacle is the
problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction.123 The vast majority of researchers
whose actions a tribe may wish to restrict will be non-Indians. Likewise,
most of the actions tribes wish to restrict, such as publication, secondary
uses, and data sharing, will occur post-research and will take place outside
tribal lands. A tribal court may have civil and not criminal jurisdiction over
a non-Indian researcher, but that jurisdiction will not follow a defendant
off tribal lands.124 Tribal courts would then face a potentially daunting
issue of comity, as there exist limits to how far a state court will go in
enforcing a tribal court order or judgment.125 A state court is less likely to
enforce an order if that order is based on principles foreign to it or on
118. MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH CODE (Am. Indian Law Ctr. 1999), available at http://
www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/NPTAOResearchProtocolsWebPage/AILawCenterModel
Code.pdf.
119. See HO-CHUNK NATION CODE tit. 3, § 3 (2005), available at http://www.nptao.ari-
zona.edu/research/tribalCodes.cfn; NAvAjo NATION CODE tit. 13, §§ 3251-3271, available at
http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/tribalCodes.cfms; HOPI CULTURAL PRESERVATION
OFFICE PROTOCOL FOR RESEARCH, PUBLICATION AND RECORDINGS: MOTION, VISUAL,
SOUND, MULTIMEDIA AND OTHER MECHANICAL DEVICES, available at http://www.nptao.ari-
zona.edu/research/tribalCodes.cfm.
120. Native Peoples Technical Assistance Office, Tribal Codes/Protocols Pertaining to Research,
U. ARIZONA, http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/tribalCodes.cfin (last visited May 8,
2012); MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH CODE (Am. Indian Law Ctr. 1999), available at http://www.
nptao.arizona.edu/research/NPTAOResearchProtocolsWebPage/ALawCenterModelCode.pdf.
121. SAHOTA, supra note 116, at 10; MODEL TRIBAL RESEARCH CODE 15-16 (Am. Indian
Law Ctr. 1999), available at http://www.nptao.arizona.edu/research/NPTAOResearchProtocols
WebPage/AlLawCenterModelCode.pdf.
122. Riley, supra note 1, at 74.




125. Id. at 16.
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principles contrary to its own. 1 2 6 For instance, a tribal code regulating re-
search on the reservation could be interpreted by a non-tribal court as
either an expression of self-government or as an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of free speech.12 7
Another jurisdictional dilemma is that tribes must also deal with indi-
viduals who circumvent tribal research regulations by working with com-
munity members who live off-reservation, or those subjects who are
willing to participate for cash despite their own tribe's rules. One strategy
tribal codes could use is to regulate the human subjects of research instead
of the investigators; this could deter subjects from cooperating with un-
scrupulous researchers and providing them with intangible cultural re-
sources. The challenge to this, however, is that statutes curtailing speech
would likely face constitutional challenges. 128 A tribe seeking to regulate
research participants must show a compelling governmental interest justify-
ing the restriction of the free speech rights of tribal members.129 This
would be difficult and ultimately unsatisfactory in cultures that place high
value on personal autonomy.o
1 3 0
While developing tribal regulation of research will effectively curtail
some cultural appropriation, broad protection of intangible cultural re-
sources may require a reliance on state law. State law would provide a
forum in state courts for tribes to file their complaints against researchers.
Tribes may seek to use contract law, which would be enforceable in state
or federal courts. Clearly drafted contracts could clarify the rights and du-
ties of the parties, could require disputes arising under the contract to be
heard in tribal courts, could stipulate remedies for non-compliance, and
could be used to establish claims against a violating researcher's
institution. 13 1
Another viable avenue for relief may be tort law. Tort law would be
attractive to tribes because it is state law, and actions can be filed in state
courts, alleviating concerns about jurisdiction. Because tort law is well-
126. Id.
127. Id. at 9.
128. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Theoretical Restrictions on the Sharing of Indigenous Biological
Knowledge: Implications for Freedom of Speech in Tribal Law, 14 KAN. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 525,
546-49 (2005).
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLELAND, RITES OF CONQUEST: THE HISTORY AND CUL-
TURE OF MICHIGAN'S NATIVE AMERICANS, 59 (1992) (discussing the concept of "individual
sovereignty" among the Anishinaabek). See generally MATTHEW L.M FLETCHER, THE EAGLE
RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIP-
PEWA INDIANS (2012) (explaining the political power of ogema, traditional leaders, in An-
ishinaabek culture).
131. There is a small body of case law applying contract law to the investigator-human
subject relationship, but it will not be treated in detail here. See E. Haavi Morreim, Medical
Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrine: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 1, 33-35 (2003).
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established law, tribes would not need to first convince Congress to
change the law. On the other hand, tribes would need to convince courts
that tort law is appropriate for their claims. The next section discusses the
rise in tort actions alleging researcher harm to human subjects. These ac-
tions show a trend toward increasing legal liability of researchers and their
institutions. This trend indicates the possibility of recognition of tort-based
harms and remedies for intangible cultural resource appropriation.
II. AVAILABILITY OF TORT LAW FOR PROTECTING INTANGIBLE
CULTURAL RESOURCES
A. Tort Law and Researcher Violations
Plaintiffs attorneys are increasingly filing class action suits and mass
torts suits (also called multidistrict litigation) on behalf of research subjects
against investigators, their institutions, IRBs, and the sponsors of re-
search. 13 2 Litigation, as frequently argued by plaintiffs' attorneys, can be an
effective tool to bring about change in a broken system. The deficiencies
of the federal system for protecting human subjects of research have been
expressed multiple times; since the late 1990s, there have been calls to
overhaul the system, including those that led to the current Proposed
Rulemaking.13 3 Unfortunately, as noted above, the current rulemaking
will not address tribal concerns.
Rose and Lodato note that suits prior to the 1990s involved "egre-
gious conduct" by investigators, such as lack of failing to notify patients
that they were participants in medical research.' 3 4 Now, lesser allegations
are being used to initiate suits. Deficiencies in informed consent (not in-
cluding within it everything that a research subject might want to know),
deficiencies in IRB review (not properly balancing risks and benefits), and
violations of federal regulations are all emerging claims in medical research
torts.13 5 Intentional infliction of emotional distress has also been used in a
number of medical cases, as have been negligence, fraud and misrepresen-
tation, and even "claims of the constitutional right to be treated with dig-
nity."1 36 Though the research discussed in this Comment is not medical,
tort claims such as the ones brought in the medical cases are instructive
because of the similarity of the possible claims. The Havasupai Reservation
case is a good example.
In 1989, the Havasupai Tribe asked anthropologist John Martin, who
had worked with the Tribe since the 1960s, to investigate the high rates of
132. Rose & Lodato, supra note 26. See generally Morreim, supra note 131 (reviewing case
law regarding clinical research).
133. David B. Resnik, Liability for Institutional Review Boards: From Regulation to Litigation,
25 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (2004).
134. Rose & Lodato, supra note 26, at 4.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1.
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diabetes among its members.' 37 Martin enlisted the aid of geneticist The-
rese Markow, and a research project was properly drawn under the IRB
protocols of Arizona State University, Martin and Markow's institution.
From the start, Markow was interested in expanding the study to include
the topic of schizophrenia. The Tribe, however, agreed only to the diabe-
tes research. Using broad and ambiguous consent forms, researchers col-
lected blood samples from over a hundred participants over the course of
several years. The search for a genetic explanation for the high rate of
diabetes among the Havasupai was fruitless and ended. However, unbe-
knownst to the Tribe, additional studies were conducted on the samples,
including research on the genetic causes of schizophrenia, rates of inbreed-
ing, and population migration. 1 3 8
Two lawsuits (laterjoined), Tilousi v. Arizona State University '3 and
Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents,140 emerged from these facts.
Although the cases ended in settlement, they are instructive for the devel-
opment of tort actions against researchers. The claims listed were: contract
enforcement; breach of fiduciary duty; negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress; fraud and misrepresentation; deficiencies in informed
consent and IRB review; negligence; conversion; unreasonable disclosure
of private facts; intrusion on seclusion and solitude; and violations of fed-
eral regulations.141 The court dismissed most of the counts. The claims of
negligence and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
however, survived.14 2
This case is instructive because it indicates the difficulties tribes face
in getting a court to recognize their harms as cognizable claims. It also
illustrates the deference courts grant to researcher's understandings of what
constitutes a risk or harm and what constitutes a benefit. The following
sections discuss these issues in reference to the elements of an action in
negligence.
B. Actions in Negligence
Tribes can make out a claim for actions in negligence that can help
protect cultural resources. Negligence is generally understood as action
that falls below an acceptable standard of due care. 143 The basic elements
of negligence are (1) duty; (2) standard of care; (3) breach of duty; (4) a
137. Whitener, supra note 19, at 236.
138. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Lessons from the Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona State University
Board of Regents: Recognizing Group, Cultural, and Dignitary Harms as Legitimate Risks Warranting
Integration into Research Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 175, 175 (2010).
139. No. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL 6199562, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005).
140. 204 P.3d 1063, 1066-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
141. Tilousi, 2005 WL 6199562, at *2-6; Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1072-77.
142. See Whitener, supra note 19, at 237; Drabiak-Syed, supra note 138, at 189-94 (analyz-
ing how the court treated each count).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
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causal relation between the defendant's conduct and the harm; and (5)
actual harm or damages.' 4 4 The elements of breach and cause are highly
dependent upon the facts of a particular case. As a result the questions to
be addressed here are whether investigators owe human subjects a duty,
what standard of care applies, and what are the harms arising from research
that can be cognizable by a court. Additionally, a tribe instigating a tort
action against a researcher, an IRB, or an institution must consider the
issue of consent. Consent is a defense to negligence and because informed
consent is a required component of IRB approval, that defense will always
be available.' 45
1. The Element of Duty
Establishing that researchers owe a duty to the human subjects of
their research is a critical issue in developing tort case law that tribes could
use as ground for claims against specific researchers and their IRBs. As
Tilousi illustrated, courts may be quick to dismiss claims that such a duty
even exists.
However, in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, the court held that a
researcher owed a duty to their human subjects.14 6 In the 1990s, the Krie-
ger Institute, an affiliate ofJohn Hopkins University, conducted a study of
lead paint abatement procedures. ' 4 7 As part of the study, researchers facili-
tated leasing of apartments with known risks of lead dust to families with
small children, so that the absorption could be measured and compared.148
The plaintiffs (the families in the study) alleged, among other things, that
the researchers did not obtain appropriate informed consent. The court
issued a scathing opinion, finding that "no degree of parental consent and
no degree of furnished information to the parents could make the experi-
ment at issue here, ethically or legally permissible.""'4 9 Tort law generally
recognizes that duties can arise from the relationship of the parties when
there would ordinarily be no duty owed between plaintiff and defendant
that would establish the duty.o5 0 At issue was whether researchers in a sci-
entific, health-related study can be said to have entered into a special rela-
tionship with research subjects that can create duties, the breach of which
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). Duty and standard of care are
often conflated, but it is desirable to keep them separated for the purposes of this Note. The
causal relationship is often divided into cause-in-fact and proximate cause, but the distinction
need not be made here.
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979) ("One who effectively con-
sents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for
the conduct or for harm resulting from it."). See generally Morreim, supra note 131.
146. 782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001).
147. Id. at 811-12.
148. Id. at 812.
149. Id. at 857-58.
150. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 57 (2010) (citing Brown v. United States, 583 F.3d 916 (6th
Cir. 2009)).
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may give rise to negligence claims.1'5 The court answered in the affirma-
tive, holding that "normally, such special relationships are created between
researchers and the human subjects used by the researchers."1 52
It is broadly recognized that a person owes a duty to "all others to
guard against injuries which naturally flow as a reasonably probable and
foreseeable consequence of an act." 5 3 In scientific investigation, it would
seem likely that those who would best be able to foresee the consequences
of the investigation are the investigators themselves. This was recognized in
Grimes. The Grimes court found that "investigators are in a better position
to anticipate, discover, and understand the potential risks to the health of
their subjects. Practical inequalities exist between researchers, who have
superior knowledge, and participants who are often poorly placed to pro-
tect themselves from risk."1 54
Part 46 also anticipates that investigators will know the risks to which
they are subjecting research participants. First, Part 46 requires that in-
formed consent include "[a] description of any reasonably foreseeable
risks or discomforts to the subject."' 5 Second, the requirement for ap-
proval of reviewed proposals is that risks to human subjects are mini-
mized.' 5 6 This can be achieved by "using procedures which are consistent
with sound research design and which do not unnecessarily expose sub-
jects to risk."' 5 7 Next, the balancing required under full review presumes
the awareness of risks to balance against anticipated benefits.15 8 When vul-
nerable populations are involved, this requires "additional safeguards" to
"protect the rights and welfare" of the subjects.' 5 9 In fact, HHS regula-
tions and the Common Rule exist for the protection of human subjects in
research, specifically their rights and welfare. This is based on the general
understanding that research may entail risk to subjects. An IRB's FWA
assures that the institution will comply with the policy. Assurances must
contain "[a] statement of principles governing the institution in the dis-
charge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human
subjects of research conducted at or sponsored by the institution . . . ."160
Finally, the fact that a duty is owed can be established by the numer-
ous provisions in Part 46 that demand investigator and IRB compliance
with law-which must necessarily include state tort duties-and otherwise
151. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 834.
152. Id. at 858.
153. 65 C.J.S. Negligence S 57 (2010) (citing Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227
(Ill. 2007)).
154. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2011).
156. Id. § 46.111(a)(1).
157. Id.
158. See id. § 46.111(a)(2).
159. Id. § 46.111(b).
160. Id. § 46.103(b)(1).
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preserve liabilities. One of the terms of the Federalwide Assurance that all
IRBs must sign is that they also comply with all "applicable federal, state,
local, or institutional laws, regulations, and policies."16 1 The regulations
then reiterate that "[c]ompliance with this policy requires compliance
with pertinent federal laws or regulations which provide additional protec-
tions for human subjects" and "[t]his policy does not affect any state or
local laws or regulations which may otherwise be applicable and which
provide additional protections for human subjects."1 6 2 If the research in-
volves pregnant women, human fetuses, or neonates, the regulations spec-
ify that the "local laws" referred to in 5 46.101(f) "include the laws of
federally recognized American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Govern-
ments."' 63 Additionally, HHS informed consent requirements "are not in-
tended to preempt any applicable federal, state, or local laws, which
require additional information to be disclosed in order for informed con-
sent to be legally effective."' 6 4 Consent forms (or oral agreements, when
applicable) cannot waive or appear to waive "any of the subject's legal
rights," nor can they release or appear to release "the investigator, the
sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence."' 65 Thus,
the regulations contemplate that researchers owe a duty to the human sub-
jects of their research.
Another type of relationship giving rise to a duty is the fiduciary
relationship; however, this may not be a winning argument to establish a
duty. Plaintiffs in Tilousi alleged that a fiduciary relationship had been cre-
ated and that it was subsequently breached. 16 6 Breach of fiduciary duty,
which results in harm, gives rise to its own cause of action.167 The fiduci-
ary relationship exists "when one of them is under a duty to act for or to
give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the
relation."s6 8 This "liability is not dependent solely upon an agreement or
contractual relation between the fiduciary and the beneficiary but results
from the relation."' 6 9 Where particular substantive law does not control
the relationship, as it does not between researcher and human subject, it
161. Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 33, 1 3(c).
162. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101.
163. Id. § 46.201(c).
164. Id. § 46.116(e).
165. Id. § 46.116.
166. Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 VL
6199562, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3 2005).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 874 (1965) ("One standing in a fiduciary rela-
tion with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty
imposed by the relation.").
168. Id. § 874 cmt. a.
169. Id. § 874 cmt. b. Tilousi raised the issue as well, but I will not address the contracts
issues in this Comment. I will, however, note that in Grimes, the court found a contract claim
between the parties stemming from informed consent. See Morreim, supra note 131, at 33-34.
Also, in Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, the court considered, and rejected, a
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may be implied in law or based on specific facts and circumstances of a
relationship between parties.170 Under the Florida law applied in Green-
berg, and upon which the court in Tilousi drew, the fiduciary relationship is
implied when it is shown on specific pleaded facts that one party placed
their trust in the other and that the other accepted-that trust.1 7 ' In Tilousi,
the court rejected altogether the claim that plaintiffs had a fiduciary rela-
tionship on the grounds that they had failed to even allege that the re-
searchers had accepted their trust and confidence.' 7 2 The court relied on
Greenberg, which found that "[t]here is no automatic fiduciary relationship
that attaches when a researcher accepts medical donations and the accept-
ance of trust, the second constitutive element of finding a fiduciary duty,
cannot be assumed once a donation is given."' 7 3
2. Standard of Care
If a duty is established, the plaintiff must then argue for a particular
standard of care to be adopted, by which to evaluate the defendant's ac-
tions for breach. Negligence normally relies on the reasonable person stan-
dard.174 This standard may be supplied by "the requirements of a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation" if its purpose is found
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose
interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest
which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the
kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest
against the particular hazard from which the harm results. 75
Where a legislative enactment or administrative regulation provides that a
violation entails civil liability, a court "must apply it."' 7 6 But where the
enactment or regulation provides only for criminal liability or contains no
provision for any liability, a court is not compelled to accept it as the stan-
dard of care.' 7 7 The court may adopt it, however, and when it does, it does
so in furtherance of the enactment's or regulation's general purpose. Be-
cause HHS regulations exist for the purpose of protecting the rights and
welfare of human subjects in research, it should be in the furtherance of
claim that research subjects were third party beneficiaries of the FWA. See Resnik, supra note
133, at 147.
170. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d.
1064, 1071 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
171. Id.
172. Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL
6199562, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3 2005) (citing to Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d. at 106.4).
173. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d. at 1072.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 282 (1965).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs 5 286 (1965).
176. Id. § 286 cmt. c.
177. Id. § 286 cmt. d.
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that purpose to adopt them as the standard in a negligence suit brought by
a subject harmed in research. Then, it would depend on the facts of a
particular case to determine whether the particular harm suffered was one
the research protocols were designed or should have been designed to pro-
tect against.
In Tilousi, it was clear that the court was not compelled to adopt Part
46 as the standard of care. The plaintiffs alleged, under a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty, that the defendants were in violation of federal regulations,
specifically 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.178 The court dismissed the claim, how-
ever, holding that "this federal regulation regarding institutional review
boards does not provide a private right of action nor does it evidence an
intent to do so."179
Part 46 has been generally interpreted to not establish a private right
of action.'8 0 The Supreme Court found that "private rights of action to
enforce federal law must be created by Congress."' 81 A court, in deter-
mining whether a private right of action exists, must also examine the
statute to see whether a private remedy has been created. Without one, "a
cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter
how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with
the statute."1 8 2 However, even if the court in Tilousi would have declined
to adopt IRB regulations as the standard of care, other courts have held
that researchers have duties imposed by federal regulations and that those
regulations establish the standard of care.'8 3 In Kus v. Sherman Hospital18 4
and Gregg v. Kane,'8 5 for example, courts found that the duties that medi-
cal researchers violated were grounded in FDA regulations for conducting
clinical trials.186
178. Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL
6199562, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3 2005).
179. Id.
180. Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D.
Wash. 2006).
181. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
182. Id. at 287; see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979).
183. Resnik, supra note 133, at 143.
184. 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (Ill. App. 1995).
185. WL 570909 at 4 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
186. Resnik, supra note 131, at 142. The FDA, and other agencies and departments that
oversee materials directly affecting the health of individuals, may have much stricter standards
than those overseeing social scientific research (which many argue has no capacity whatsoever to
harm subjects). Therefore, Kus and Gregg may not actually be promising precedents in a case
involving the appropriation of intangible cultural resources. However, professional codes of eth-
ics are also good choices for courts to adopt as establishing a standard of care, and the social
sciences, unlike the humanities generally, have codified ethics to consult.
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3. Breach of Duty
Next, in establishing a claim in negligence, a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant breached the duty owed. A person's failure to exercise
due care constitutes breach of duty.18 7 Showing breach, and more so,
showing causality, would depend greatly on the specific facts of an actual
case. However, some general comments can be made. In the process of
developing a claim of investigator negligence, a plaintiff should file a com-
plaint with OHRP's Division of Compliance oversight. OHRP may un-
dertake an investigation of a researcher and/or the institution approving his
or her research at its discretion.188 OHRP maintains a database of compli-
ance oversight determinations that lists examples of noncompliance.' 89
These precedents can be used to establish that a particular researcher has
failed to comply with HHS policy. The effect of a violation depends on
whether a court adopts HHS regulations as the standard of care. Under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "The unexcused violation of a legislative en-
actment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as
defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in it-
self."1 90 Therefore, adoption of a regulation as the standard of care sup-
ports a claim of negligence per se, which obviates the need to show
causality. In Tilousi, the court rejected the claim of negligence per se but
preserved the claims of negligence and gross negligence, finding that plain-
tiffs had stated a "legally sufficient claim that defendants breached a duty
owed to plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care in conducting research with
human research subjects and that the alleged breach caused damage to
plaintiffs."191
4. Actual Harm
The final element of the tort of negligence is the showing of actual
harm. Again, it can be shown that the HHS regulations intend to protect
against specific harms to human subjects. When research only involves
methods such as a survey or an interview-methods characteristic of social
science-the research usually is exempt. However, the research will not
qualify as exempt if "any disclosure of the human subjects' responses
outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal
or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, em-
ployability, or reputation."1 9 2 Thus the rules contemplate distinct harms
187. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 57 (2010).
188. Compliance Oversight Procedures for Evaluating Institutions, supra note 38.
189. Office for Human Research Prots., Recent Compliance Oversight Determinations, U.S.
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/findings/
index.htm1#A4 (last visited May 7, 2012).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(1) (1965).
191. Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290-PCT-FJM, 2005 WL
6199562, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005).
192. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(2) (2011).
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that could arise from research using these methods, such as criminal and
civil liability, damage to financial standing, employability, and reputa-
tion-but only for individuals. Furthermore, the three categories of risk
that are anticipated by the regulations and guide the assessment of level of
review identify specific types of harm that may be the consequence of
research. As discussed above, physical risks are associated with medical re-
search and are unlikely to result from social science research, but psycho-
logical and informational risks are much more foreseeable in the social
science context. Some of these specific harms include: anxiety, stress, de-
pression, feelings of betrayal, and inappropriate disclosure of information
that can cause emotional or social harm, to individuals or groups. 193
These harms, while general, are quite difficult to show. In fact, the
greatest challenge in using tort law to address wrongs to tribal citizens by
outside researchers will be in showing harm. This is because what consti-
tutes a cognizable harm and its conceptions of what is acceptable treatment
of one human being by another is rooted in Euro-American common law.
These conceptions will naturally vary somewhat from culture to culture,
but the courts that would hear the tort claims of tribes operate in a cultur-
ally foreign environment that may prescribe different rights and duties to
persons and thus may recognize harm in different way. The harms alleged
in Tilousi, for instance, were culturally specific. As Drabiak-Syed explains,
the court there failed to appreciate the tribal beliefs about biological
materials, especially blood.194 Instead, the court agreed with scientists who
argued that such beliefs are mere superstitions and that the plaintiffs' claims
were "hysterical" and an impediment to scientific progress.1 95 Such po-
larizations-where what is common decency to one is offensive to an-
other-implicate the issue of the cultural locatedness of the reasonable
person and will drastically skew a court's evaluation of the balancing be-
tween risks and benefits that any researcher has made.
The most significant obstacle in achieving common law recognition
of a tribe's culturally-based harms lies in the fact that in most areas of
Euro-American law, the focus is on the individual. But individuals are not
the only ones who can suffer harm from research.' 9 6 In fact, individuals are
not even the only persons who are targeted as the subjects of research.
Ethnography, for instance, is the study of the group, not the individual
even if the individual is one through whom information about the group is
193. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512, 44515-16
(July 26, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 (2012) and 25 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2012)).
194. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 138, at 196-97.
195. Id. Note the similarities between this argument and how archaeologists framed the
debates about repatriation before NAGPRA's passage.
196. Id. at 216-21; see also Debra Harry, Ind(genous Peoples and Gene Disputes, 84 CHi.-
KENT L. REV. 147, 154 (2009); Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native
American Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 396, 396-97
(2007).
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extracted. However, human subjects protection focuses on the individual,
not the group. Sahota notes that the Belmont Report focuses on the indi-
vidual and does not consider the rights of groups or their needs for protec-
tion in the context of human subjects research.' 97 The tribe, not just the
research subjects, needs to know that research is being conducted. Also,
the tribe and not just subjects needs to give consent for that research.19 8
Furthermore, any benefits that could result from research may be beneficial
to the tribe and not just the individual subjects. Any risk involved in par-
ticipation may be a risk borne by the tribe and not just the individual.19 9
Despite these risks, convincing a court that the tribe, and not just individ-
uals, has a cause of action is difficult. In Tilousi, the primary argument of
one of the defendants in their motion to dismiss was that the tribe could
not have suffered any harms because only individuals, not the tribe, pro-
vided biological materials. 200 The court in its analysis treated the plaintiffs
as a collection of individuals, which included those from which blood was
drawn, and did not consider the tribe as a plaintiff
CONCLUSION
IP law is problematic as a way to protect intangible cultural resources.
Developing tribal-based research regulation and asserting tribal interests in
state courts under existing tort law is a better way to protect intangible
cultural resources in a way that respects tribal interests. Tribes should de-
velop IRBs, and possibly tribal codes, to exercise regulatory jurisdiction
over outside researchers on their lands. Tribes should also seek remedies
under state tort law for expropriations of their heritage. Certainly, difficul-
ties exist in extending tort law to harms Indians and tribes have suffered
from researcher appropriation of intangible cultural resources. However,
because these harms are anticipated by human subjects protections regula-
tions, it is possible to satisfy all the elements for an action in negligence
when researchers violate those regulations.
197. SAHOTA, supra note 116, at 3.
198. Id. at 3-4.
199. Id. NCAI, in its comments to the HHS's ANPRM, also recommended that the regu-
lations be changed to recognize group harms to tribes and Indian communities. NAT'L CONG.
OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 22, at 9.
200. Whitener, supra note 19, at 237-38.
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